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Abstract. We study a hedonic game for which the feasible coalitions are pre-
scribed by a graph representing the agents’ social relations. A group of agents
can form a feasible coalition if and only if their corresponding vertices can be
spanned with a star. This requirement guarantees that agents are connected, close
to each other, and one central agent can coordinate the actions of the group. In
our game everyone strives to join the largest feasible coalition. We study the
existence and computational complexity of both Nash stable and core stable par-
titions. Then, we provide tight or asymptotically tight bounds on their quality,
with respect to both the price of anarchy and stability, under two natural social
functions, namely, the number of agents who are not in a singleton coalition, and
the number of coalitions. We also derive refined bounds for games in which the
social graph is restricted to be claw-free. Finally, we investigate the complexity
of computing socially optimal partitions as well as extreme Nash stable ones.
Keywords: Hedonic Games · Price of Anarchy/Stability · Graphs.
1 Introduction
Coalition formation, that is the process by which agents gather into groups, is a fervent
research topic at the intersection of Multi-Agent Systems, Computational Social Choice
and Algorithmic Game Theory. One of the most studied models of coalition formation
is that of hedonic games [6, 8, 13, 20], where agents have preferences over all possible
coalitions they can belong to. As agents are usually assumed to be self-interested, an
acceptable outcome for a hedonic game, that is a partition of agents into coalitions,
needs to be resistant to agents’ deviations. Several notions of stability have been inves-
tigated in the literature, such as, individual stability, Nash stability, core stability (see,
for instance, [1]).
In a recent paper, Igarashi and Elkind [21] add a further constraint to the definition
of acceptable outcomes for hedonic games, by introducing the notion of feasible coali-
tion: a coalition is feasible if and only if it complies with some prescribed properties.
For instance, they assume that the set of agents corresponds to the vertex set V (G) of a
social graph G and require a coalition to induce a connected subgraph of G.
In this work, we restrict the feasibility constraint of [21] to coalitions inducing a
subgraph of G admitting a spanning star. This requirement guarantees that agents are
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connected, close to each other, and one central agent can coordinate the actions of the
group. We apply this framework within a basic model, falling within the class of addi-
tive separable symmetric hedonic games, in which an agent’s utility is defined by the
cardinality of the coalition she belongs to.
1.1 Game Model, Definitions and Notation
Given an unweighted and undirected graph G = (V,E), a coalition is any non-empty
subset of V . A partition of V is a set of pairwise disjoint coalitions whose union equals
V . We denote by F ⊆ 2V the set of feasible coalitions. We shall consider F = {C ∈
2V | G[C] can be spanned with a star}, where G[C] is the subgraph of G induced by C
and a star is a tree of depth at most 1. A star on one vertex is called trivial.
Given an undirected, unweighted and connected graph G, game (G,F) is defined
as follows. Each vertex ofG is associated with an agent in the game. LetΠ be the set of
partitions of V . For a partition pi ∈ Π and a vertex i ∈ V , denote as pi(i) the coalition
in pi containing i. The utility of i in pi is defined as
ui(pi) =
{ |pi(i)| if pi(i) ∈ F ,
0 otherwise. (1)
We say that agent i has a profitable deviation in pi if either pi(i) /∈ F , or there exists
a coalition C ∈ pi such that C ∪ {i} ∈ F and |C| ≥ |pi(i)|. In the first case agent
i can form the singleton coalition {i} which is feasible because it is spanned by a
trivial star and yields a utility equal to 1 > ui(pi) = 0. In the second case, agent i
increases her utility by joiningC. More generally, a set of agents S has a joint profitable
deviation in pi if there exists a partition pi′, obtained from pi by letting every agent i ∈ S
leave coalition pi(i) and either join another coalition in pi or form a new one, such that
ui(pi
′) > ui(pi) for each i ∈ S.
A partition pi is Nash stable (resp. Strong Nash stable) if no agent (resp. no set
of agents) has a profitable deviation (resp. a joint profitable deviation) in pi. Nash and
strong Nash stable partitions correspond to (pure) Nash and Strong equilibria respec-
tively. We say that a partition is feasible if each of its coalitions belongs to F . It is easy
to see that, by definition, any Nash stable partition is feasible. In a core stable parti-
tion pi, there is no coalition C for which all its members are better off by forming C.
The set of core stable partitions (simply called the core) is a subset of the set of Nash
stable ones. Strong Nash stability implies core stability but the converse is not always
true. Nevertheless, because every agent only cares about the size of its coalition if it is
feasible, like in anonymous hedonic games [6], strong Nash stability and core stability
coincide in our game. We will use the word core instead of strong Nash for the rest of
this article.
A social function is a function, defined from Π to R≥0, measuring the social value
of a partition. A social optimum is a partition pi∗ ∈ F optimizing a given social func-
tion. We consider the following two social functions: sociality, defined as soc(pi) =
|{i ∈ V : |pi(i)| > 1}|, and fragmentation, defined as frag(pi) = |pi|. Sociality needs
to be maximized, while fragmentation needs to be minimized.
We evaluate the efficiency of stable partitions by means of the well established
notions of price of anarchy (PoA), price of stability (PoS) and their strong versions
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(SPoA and SPoS). The PoA (resp. PoS) of game (G,F) with respect to sociality is
defined as soc(pi
∗)
soc(pi) , where pi
∗ is a social optimum and pi is a Nash stable partition of
minimum (resp. maximum) sociality. The PoA (resp. PoS) of game (G,F) with respect
to fragmentation is defined as frag(pi)frag(pi∗) , where pi
∗ is a social optimum and pi is a Nash
stable partition of maximum (resp. minimum) fragmentation. By substituting the notion
of Nash stable partition with that of core stable one, we obtain the definition of both the
SPoA and SPoS. Observe that, for a given game (G,F) and independently of the chosen
social function, PoS(G,F) ≤ SPoS(G,F) ≤ SPoA(G,F) ≤ PoA(G,F).
1.2 Some Motivations
Requiring subgraphs spanned by a star can be interpreted as restricting the model of [21]
to communication patterns of small length. In comparison, unbounded multi-hop com-
munication may be costlier, slower, and prone to errors or misunderstandings. There-
fore, distant communication should be avoided. These observations provide both theo-
retical and practical motivations for the constraint considered in this work. Moreover,
our game, complemented with a suitable social function, naturally models several inter-
esting scenarios, some of which are outlined in the following.
Unions. Assume that V (G) models a set of workers of a given company, the edge
set E(G) the ideological acquaintance, and that the power of a union is measured by
its size. Thus, workers want to join the largest unions. However, a union can survive
only if it has a leader who is ideologically close to its partners. For this model, it makes
sense considering the fragmentation social function that aims at minimizing the number
of unions representing the workers and augmenting their negotiation power.
Group Buying. Assume that V (G) models a set of buyers, all interested in the same
product, and E(G) their knowledge/trust relationships. Buyers enjoy flowing into large
buying groups, as the larger the group, the better the purchasing conditions they can
fetch. However, negotiation with the seller is carried out by one group member only,
who then gets also in charge of redistributing what is bought to the others. Thus, this
agent needs to be trusted by everybody. If one considers the case in which the product
has a fixed price and the share each agent pays is equal to the price divided by the
cardinality of her buying group, fragmentation becomes equal to the sum of the costs
of all players, i.e., to the utilitarian social function.
Sport Tournaments. Assume that V (G) models a set of teams and there is an
edge between two teams if they are close enough to meet and practice a given sport
(e.g. football). The participants gather into groups in such a way that a central member
can host all teams of its group and organize a tournament. Teams will prefer larger
tournaments to small ones in order to maximize the number of opponents against which
they can play a match. Sociality, here, aims at involving as many teams as possible into
the organization of local tournaments, no matter how big those events are.
1.3 Contribution
We focus on the complexity and efficiency of both Nash stable and core stable parti-
tions. Some proofs are omitted due to space constraints.
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As to complexity results, we provide two constructive evidences showing existence
of core stable partitions, and so also of Nash stable ones. In particular, any sequence of
joint profitable deviations converges to a core stable partition, while Theorem 1 charac-
terizes the core as the set of all possible outputs of a polynomial time greedy algorithm.
These two facts complement each other, as the first does not need any coordination
among the agents, but provides no guarantees of fast convergence, whereas the sec-
ond, while requiring centralized coordination (dictated by the greedy choices of the
proposed algorithm), guarantees efficient computation. We then provide bounds on the
PoA, PoS, SPoA and SPoS under social functions sociality and fragmentation. In par-
ticular, we consider games induced by general (unrestricted) graphs and games induced
by claw-free graphs. These results are summarized in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Bounds on the efficiency of both Nash stable and core stable partitions with respect to
social functions sociality and fragmentation. In the last column k =
√
n+ 4− 2.
It turns out that the presence of claws in the social graph defining the game is a
provable source of inefficiency that has to be taken into account, for instance, whenever
mechanisms for coping with selfish behavior can be designed and applied.
Finally, we also address the problem of computing outcomes with prescribed wel-
fare guarantees. In particular, we consider the computation of social optima and extreme
(i.e., either best or worst) Nash stable partitions under both social functions. We design a
polynomial time algorithm to compute a social optimum for sociality and prove that all
other problems are NP-hard, except for that of computing a worst Nash stable partition
under fragmentation whose complexity remains open.
1.4 Related Work
The language for describing which coalitions are feasible, and how agents value them,
is a critical feature in hedonic games. Like in [12, 9], feasible coalitions and their values
can be described with the help of a (directed) graph. Igarashi and Elkind [21] and Peters
[28] have considered hedonic games defined over graphs: agents are the vertices and
feasible coalitions satisfy a given graph property. Regarding the worth of a coalition, a
simple and compact representation is given by additively separable functions [6]: each
agent i assigns a value νij to agent j and agent i’s worth for a coalition C is
∑
j∈C νij .
See, for example, [24] for a simple hedonic game where νij ∈ {0, 1}. Our work falls
in this framework, as everybody wants to be part of the largest coalition (νij is always
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Algorithm 1 Greedy Core
Input: Game (G,F) where G = (V,E) is a graph.
Output: A core stable partition pi.
1: while V 6= ∅ do
2: take i ∈ V maximizing the degree dG(i)
3: pi(i)← NG[i] *NG[i] is the closed neighbourhood of i*
4: G← G[V \NG[i]]
5: end while
6: return pi
1), and a coalition is feasible if and only if the vertices representing the agents can be
covered with a star.
Regarding existing games defined over graphs, Panagopoulou and Spirakis [26] and
Escoffier et al. [15] studied a game where the vertices of a graph have to select a color
(each color corresponds to a coalition), and a vertex’s payoff is the number of agents
with the same color, provided that it constitutes an independent set.
In many works including the famous stable marriage problem, the coalitions form a
matching of a graph (see for example [20]).
For bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability in some classes of
hedonic games, one can see [4, 7, 16, 22, 23]. The computation of socially optimal par-
titions in hedonic games, according to different social functions, has been treated in [5,
10, 11, 17, 9]. Finally, we refer the reader to [2, 3, 25, 27] for an extensive treatment of
the computational complexity of both decision and search problems related to stable
partitions in hedonic games.
2 On Core Stable Partitions
Given a partition pi, a strong Nash dynamics of length ` starting from pi is a sequence of
partitions 〈pi = pi0, pi1, . . . , pi`〉 such that, for each j ≥ 1, pij is obtained as a result of a
joint profitable deviation of some set of agents in pij−1.
A game has the lexicographical improvement property (LIP) [19], if every joint
profitable deviation strictly decreases the lexicographical order of a certain function
defined on Π . It is not difficult to see that for any graph G, game (G,F) has the LIP
property if one considers the n-dimensional vector consisting of the values ui(pi) for
each i ∈ V , sorted in non-increasing order. Thus, a core stable partition always exists
as the length of every strong Nash dynamics is finite.
We now prove that, if centralized coordination is allowed, a core stable partition can
be computed in polynomial time. This is done by proving that the core is completely
characterized by the set of all possible outputs of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. A partition is core stable if and only if it is the output of Algorithm 1
(according to some specific tie breaking rule).
Proof. The algorithm outputs a feasible partition pi. First we show that pi is core stable.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that pi is not core stable. Then, there exists a joint
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profitable deviation in pi for a coalition S such that |S| ≥ 1. Let i be the agent getting
the highest utility in pi among the ones belonging to S. As i improves, she will end up
in a coalition C ∈ F such that |C| > |pi(i)|. If C is created by the algorithm before
pi(i), then i should belong to C in pi: a contradiction to the greedy choice. Hence,
either C is created by the algorithm after pi(i) or it is a new coalition created by the
joint deviation. As i gets the highest utility in S, C only contains vertices belonging to
coalitions created by the algorithm at the step pi(i) is created or after. This implies that,
at the step in which pi(i) is created, C could have been created too, thus contradicting
the greedy choice.
Now, we show that any core stable partition pi can be the output of the above algo-
rithm. List the coalitions in pi by non-increasing cardinality and define a tie breaking
ruleR that gives priority to the coalitions in pi according to the given ordering, and gives
higher priority to a coalition in pi with respect to any coalition not in pi. Run the algo-
rithm according to ruleR to obtain a partition pi′. Assume, by way of contradiction, that
pi 6= pi′. List the coalitions in pi′ by non-increasing cardinality, breaking ties according
to R. Let j be the first index at which the two sequences become different and denote
as C and C ′ the j-th coalition in the ordering defined on pi and pi′, respectively. By the
definition of R, it must be |C ′| > |C| which implies that all vertices in C ′ can perform
a joint profitable deviation in pi. This contradicts the assumption that pi is a core stable
partition. uunionsq
3 Efficiency of Core/Nash Stable Partitions
In this section, we focus on the efficiency of Nash or core stable partitions with respect
to both social functions sociality and fragmentation. Before characterizing the price of
anarchy, we prove some preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 1. IfG admits a spanning star, then any Nash stable partition for game (G,F)
is formed by a unique coalition V (G).
Lemma 2. If G is connected with n ≥ 3, then any Nash stable partition for game
(G,F) contains either 2 coalitions of size at least 2 or a coalition of size at least 3.
We are now ready to characterize the PoA. As it is equal to 1 for any game with
three players (by Lemma 1), in the remaining of the section we shall assume n ≥ 4.
Theorem 2. For any game with n players, the price of anarchy is n/3 with respect to
sociality and (n− 2)/2 with respect to fragmentation. Both bounds are tight.
Proof. Fix a Nash stable partition pi. By Lemma 2, soc(pi) ≥ 3. As the sociality of
any partition is upper bounded by n, we obtain an upper bound of n/3 on the price
of anarchy. By Lemma 1, if the fragmentation of the social optimum is 1, then the
price of anarchy is 1, hence assume that its fragmentation is at least 2. By Lemma 2,
frag(pi) ≤ n− 2 which yields the desired upper bound on the price of anarchy.
A matching lower bound for both social functions can be obtained by considering
the game induced by the graphG depicted in Figure 2. The partition pi such that pi(v1) =
{v1, v2, v3} and pi(vi) = {vi} for i > 3 is Nash stable and has soc(pi) = 3 and
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frag(pi) = n− 2. On the other hand, the partition pi∗ such that pi∗(v1) = {v1, v2} and
pi∗(v3) = {v3, . . . , vn} has a sociality of n and a fragmentation of 2. Comparing the
two partitions yields the desired lower bounds. uunionsq
v1
v2
v3
v4
vn
Fig. 2. A graph yielding a game with worst-case price of anarchy.
It is also possible to give an upper bound on the price of anarchy with respect to
both social functions which depends on the stability number α(G) of graph G, where
α(G) is the largest size of an independent set.
Theorem 3. The price of anarchy of game (G,F) is at most nn−α(G)+1 with respect to
sociality and at most α(G)2 with respect to fragmentation.
Proof. Fix a Nash stable partition pi. As the set of centres of the stars spanning the
subgraph induced by each coalition in pi forms an independent set in G, it follows
that frag(pi) ≤ α(G). Thus, by Lemma 2, it follows that the price of anarchy with
respect to fragmentation is at most α(G)2 . Moreover, as G has at least one edge, the
number of singleton coalitions in pi can be at most frag(pi) − 1 ≤ α(G) − 1. So,
soc(pi) ≥ n− α(G) + 1. uunionsq
For the efficiency of core stable outcomes, we have the following results.
Theorem 4. For any game (G,F)with n players SPoS(G,F) ∈
[
n
2+
√
n−2 ,
n
1+
√
n−1
]
and SPoA(G,F) = n
1+
√
n−1 hold for the sociality function.
Proof. For the upper bound, consider a coalition C in a core stable partition pi with
|C| = k > 2 and let c be the center of the spanning star of G[C]. No vertex i belonging
to a singleton coalition can be adjacent to c, otherwise i would have a profitable devia-
tion in pi. Any vertex i ∈ C, with i 6= c can be adjacent to at most k−2 vertices belong-
ing to a singleton coalition, otherwise these vertices, together with i and c would have a
joint profitable deviation in pi. It follows that for any coalition in pi with k > 2 vertices,
there can be at most (k − 1)(k − 2) singleton coalitions in pi. Let sk be the number of
coalitions in pi with k vertices for k ≥ 1. We deduce ∑nk=3 (sk(k2 − 3k + 2)) ≥ s1
which gives
∑n
k=2
(
sk(k
2 − 2k + 2)) ≥ n by adding∑nk=2 ksk on both sides.
As the sociality in a social optimum is upper bounded by n and soc(pi) =
∑n
k=2(skk),
we obtain that the strong price of anarchy is at most n∑n
k=2(skk)
≤ k2−2k+2
k
, where
k = max{k : sk > 0}. Moreover, as soc(pi) ≥ k, the strong price of anarchy is
trivially upper bounded by n/k. It follows that the minimum of the two derived bounds
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is maximized for k
2 − 2k+2 = n⇔ k = 1+√n− 1, which yields the desired upper
bound on both SPoA(G,F) and SPoS(G,F).
For the lower bound on the strong price of anarchy, consider the game induced by a
tree G rooted at vertex x0 which has ` children denoted as x1, . . . , x`. For each i ∈ [`],
xi has `−1 children, so thatG has n = `2+1 vertices. By using the characterization of
core stable partitions given in Theorem 1, it follows that the partition pi whose unique
non-singleton coalition is {x0, x1, . . . , x`} is a core stable partition for game (G,F).
As soc(pi) = `+1 and there is a partition with sociality n, we get that the strong price of
anarchy is lower bounded by n`+1 . By using n = `
2 + 1, it follows that n`+1 =
n
1+
√
n−1
and this provides the desired lower bound.
For the lower bound on the strong price of stability, add a vertex y to the previous
instance which is solely connected to x0, so that G now has n = `2 + 2 vertices. In
this case, the partition pi whose unique non-singleton coalition is {x0, x1, . . . , x`, y} is
the unique core stable partition for game (G,F). As soc(pi) = ` + 2, we get that the
strong price of stability is lower bounded by n`+2 . By using n = `
2 + 2, it follows that
n
`+2 =
n
2+
√
n−2 and this provides the desired lower bound. uunionsq
Theorem 5. For any instance (G,F) of the game with n players and the fragmentation
function, it holds that dn/2e/2 ≤ PoS(G,F) ≤ SPoA(G,F) ≤ n/4 + 11/20.
Proof. Let pi be a core stable partition and set k = ∆(G) + 1, where ∆(G) is the
maximum degree of G. It follows that the fragmentation of the social optimum is at
least dn/ke. From Theorem 1, we know that there is a coalition of size k in pi. Thus
frag(pi) ≤ 1 + n − k, and SPoA(G,F) ≤ k(1+n−k)n . If n is even then k(1+n−k)n ≤
n/4 + 1/2, otherwise k(1+n−k)n ≤ (n+1)
2
4n =
n
4 +
1
2 +
1
4n ≤ n4 + 1120 , where the last
inequality is due to the hypothesis n ≥ 4 (the smallest odd n is 5).
To show the lower bound when n is even, consider the game induced by the graph de-
picted in Figure 3. We have a social optimum pi∗ such that pi∗(x1) = {x1, . . . , xbn/2c}
and pi∗(y1) = V \ pi∗(x1) and yielding frag(pi∗) = 2. There are only two Nash stable
partitions, namely pi1 and pi2, both having fragmentation equal to dn/2e. In particular,
pi1 is such that pi1(x1) = {x1, . . . , xbn/2c, y1} and pi1(yi) = {yi} for i > 1, while pi2
flips the roles of x and y. When n is odd, take the same instance and add a new vertex
solely connected to x1 to get the lower bound of dn/2e/2. uunionsq
x1 y1
x2
xbn/2c
y2
ybn/2c
Fig. 3. A graph yielding a game with worst-case price of stability with respect to fragmentation.
We conclude the section with a lower bound on the price of stability for the sociality
social function showing that the quality of the best Nash stable partition cannot be better
than twice that of the worst core stable one.
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Theorem 6. For any game with n players, the price of stability with respect to sociality
is at least n
2
√
n−1 .
Proof. Consider the game yielded by the graph G = (V,E) such that V = X ∪ Y1 ∪
. . . ∪ Y`, with X = {x1, . . . , x`} and, for each i ∈ [`], Yi = {yi,1, . . . , yi,`−1}. The
set of edges E is such that G[X] = K` (i.e. complete graph on ` vertices) and, for
each i ∈ [`] each vertex in Yi is connected to xi only. Note that, by setting ` =
√
n, we
obtain |V | = n. We shall prove that, in any Nash stable partition, the sociality is at most
2
√
n− 1. Given that there is a partition of sociality n, this will yield the corresponding
lower bound. Fix a Nash stable partition pi. We claim that pi contains a unique non-
singleton coalition containing X . This easily follows from the fact that X defines a
clique and that, by the topology of G, in any feasible coalition C containing a vertex of
x ∈ X , C induces a subgraph of G admitting a spanning star centred at x. Moreover,
as pi is Nash stable, we shall have that the unique non-singleton coalition in pi will also
contain all vertices in Yi for a certain i ∈ [`]. No other vertices of G can be added
to the coalition without violating the feasibility constraint and no other non-singleton
coalition can be constructed as the remaining vertices yield an independent set of G.
Hence, the sociality of pi is 2
√
n− 1. uunionsq
3.1 Claw-Free Graphs
In this subsection, we consider the case in which the graph G is claw-free, i.e., it does
not contain an induced K1,3 (i.e. complete bipartite graph with 1 and 3 vertices on the
respective sides). It will turn out that the presence of claws in graph G is a provable
source of inefficiency as the price of anarchy with respect to both social functions (and
so also all the other metrics) for games played on claw-free graphs drops to a value
which never exceeds 2. Claws (and more generally induced stars with a large number
of leaves) are problematic for our social functions when the center c of a claw belongs
to a partition pi(c) which does not admit a spanning star of center c. In this case some
leaves of the claw are isolated: they cannot join pi(c) or group themselves because they
are disconnected. For the social function sociality, the following two theorems provide
an asymptotically tight characterization.
Theorem 7. For any game with n players, the price of anarchy with respect to sociality
is at most n
n−bn−12 c
, that is 2nn+2 and
2n
n+1 when n is even and odd, respectively.
Proof. Fix a Nash stable partition pi and let i be a vertex belonging to a singleton coali-
tion in pi. Clearly, i cannot be adjacent to a vertex being a center of a spanning star of
any subgraph induced by a coalition in pi. So, i can only be adjacent to leaves of span-
ning stars of any subgraph induced by coalitions in pi. Assume that there exists a vertex
j also belonging to a singleton coalition in pi and sharing a neighbour k with i. Let c be
the center of a star spanning G[pi(k)]. As {i, j, c} is independent, we find that the set
of vertices {i, j, k, c} induces a claw in G: a contradiction. Two vertices forming a sin-
gleton coalition cannot share the same leaf of a star spanning a non-singleton coalition.
Thus, denote by α the number of vertices that are centres of a star spanning the subgraph
induced by a non-singleton coalition in pi, we get that the number of vertices forming
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singleton coalitions in pi, which is integral, is upper bounded by bn−α2 c ≤ bn−12 c. This
implies that soc(pi) ≥ n − bn−12 c, which yields the desired upper bound because the
optimal sociality soc(pi∗) is n. uunionsq
Theorem 8. For any game with n players, the price of stability with respect to sociality
is at least n
n−bn−12 c
.
Proof. Suppose n = 2p and consider the graph G2p = (V2p, E2p) such that V2p =
Xp ∪ Yp, where Xp = {x1, . . . , xp}, Yp = {y1, . . . , yp}, Xp forms a clique, and each
vertex yi is adjacent to vertex xi. One can see that G2p is claw-free, and Xp ⊆ pi(xi)
for any Nash stable partition pi. Moreover, to have feasibility, a coalition C can contain
at most one vertex from Yp. It follows that the sociality of any Nash stable partition is
at most p + 1. As there exists a partition with sociality 2p, the claimed lower bound
follows. For n = 2p+ 1, use the same construction with Yp = {y1, . . . , yp−1}. uunionsq
For the fragmentation social function, a slightly different situation occurs.
Theorem 9. For any game with n players, the price of anarchy with respect to frag-
mentation is at most 2.
Proof. Fix a Nash stable partition pi. If frag(pi) ≤ 2, we are done. If frag(pi) ≥ 3,
consider three distinct coalitions C1, C2, C3 ∈ pi and let c1, c2 and c3 be the centres of
the spanning stars of G[C1], G[C2] and G[C3], respectively. As pi is Nash stable, the
set of vertices U = {c1, c2, c3} induces an independent set of G. We claim that these
vertices cannot belong to a same cluster in some social optimum pi∗. Assume, by way
of contradiction, that there exists a cluster C∗ ∈ pi∗ containing U . As U induces an
independent set of G no vertex in U can be the center of the star spanning G[C∗]. So,
there exists c∗ ∈ C∗ which is adjacent to all vertices in U . But U ∪ {c∗} induces a
claw: a contradiction. Hence, for every two coalitions in pi, there must exist a distinct
coalition in pi∗ which yields the desired upper bound. uunionsq
Theorem 10. For any positive integer k, there exists a game whose strong price of
stability with respect to fragmentation is at least 2kk+1 .
Proof. For an integer k ≥ 1, define the following graph Gk. The set of vertices is
V = X1 ∪ . . . ∪ Xk ∪ Y ∪ Z, with Y = {y1, . . . , yk} and Z = {za1 , zb1, . . . , zak , zbk}
so that |Z| = 2k. As to sets Xi for i ∈ [k], we have that |Xi| = 2i, Gk(Xi) induces
a clique and Xi contains two special vertices, namely xi and xi, which are the only
vertices adjacent to vertices in V \ Xi. In particular, xi is adjacent to both zai and zbi ,
while xi is adjacent to yi and, for i < k, to both z
a
i+1 and z
b
i+1. Finally, for each i ∈ [k],
zai and z
b
i are adjacent and, for i > 1, they are both adjacent to yi−1. Again, we show
two fundamental properties:
Property 1. (i) Gk is claw-free, (ii) (Xi ∪ {zai , zbi }, {yi} | i ∈ [k]) is a core stable
partition.
Consider the feasible partition pi∗ containing the following coalitions: Xk ∪{yk}, Xi ∪
{yi}∪{zai+1, zbi+1} for each i ∈ [k−1] and {za1 , zb1}. As frag(pi) = k+1, the claimed
lower bound follows. uunionsq
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Theorem 11. For any game with n players, the price of stability with respect to frag-
mentation is 1.
Proof. Our aim is to show that, given a partition pi, it is possible to schedule profitable
deviations so as to obtain a Nash dynamics starting from pi and ending up to a Nash
stable partition pi` such that frag(pi`) ≤ frag(pi). Choosing a social optimum as start-
ing partition will yield the claim. Our scheduling algorithm is defined as follows: given
a partition pi, if more than one player have a profitable deviation in pi, break ties in
favour of a player who does not constitute a center for any spanning star of the sub-
graph induced by the coalition she belongs to. By the LIP property, we are guaranteed
that the Nash dynamics defined by this scheduling algorithm always ends to a Nash
stable partition pi` for any starting partition pi.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that frag(pi`) > frag(pi). This implies that
there are two partitions pi, pi′ ∈ Π and a player i such that pi′ is obtained as a result of a
profitable deviation of i in pi and frag(pi) < frag(pi′). The latter condition can happen
only if G[pi(i) \ {i}] does not admit a spanning star, which implies that G[pi(i)] admits
only one spanning star centred at i. So, there are at least two distinct vertices u and v
other than i belonging to pi(i). LetC ∈ pi be the coalition joined by i and let j 6= i be the
center of a spanning star for G[C ∪ {i}]. Clearly it must be {i, j} ∈ E. If {u, j} ∈ E,
then C ∪{u} ∈ F . But as uu(pi) = ui(pi) = |pi(i)| < ui(pi′) = |C ∪{i}| = |C ∪{u}|,
it follows that u has a profitable deviation in pi and, by the definition of the scheduling
algorithm, i should have not been chosen. The same argument holds for v. Thus, we
have detected a set of vertices {i, j, u, v} inducing a claw in G: a contradiction. uunionsq
4 Computing Partitions with Prescribed Properties
In this section, we address the complexity of computing partitions with some prescribed
properties, such as, for example, being a social optimum or being a Nash stable partition
either maximizing or minimizing a given social function.
4.1 Computing a Social Optimum
Proposition 1. Computing a social optimum with respect to fragmentation is NP-hard,
even for claw-free graphs.
The following result relies on the efficient computation of a minimum edge-cover.
Proposition 2. For connected graphs on n vertices, computing a social optimum pi∗
with respect to sociality is polynomial and soc(pi∗) = n.
4.2 Computing an Extreme Stable Partition
Using Theorem 11 and Proposition 1, we deduce that computing a best Nash stable
partition with respect to fragmentation is NP-hard, even for claw-free graphs. We now
show that hardness holds also for the sociality social function.
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Theorem 12. Computing the best Nash stable partition with respect to sociality is NP-
hard when the input graph G has maximum degree equal to 5.
Proof. We propose a reduction from 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING (3-DM in short).
An instance of 3-DM consists of a collection C = {s1, . . . , sm} ⊆ X × Y × Z of
m triples, where X = {x1, . . . , xn}, Y = {y1, . . . , yn} and Z = {z1, . . . , zn} are
3 pairwise disjoint sets of size n. A matching is a subset M ⊆ C such that no two
elements in M agree in any coordinate, and the purpose of 3-DM is to answer the
question: does there exist a perfect matching M on C, that is, a matching of size n?
This problem is known to be NP-complete (problem [SP1] page 221 in [18]), even
if each element t ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z appears in at most 3 triples. We start from such an
instance I = (C, X ∪Y ∪Z) of 3-DM and we build a game (G,F), whereG = (V,E)
is as follows. Vertex set contains L ∪ R where L = {l1, . . . , lm} corresponds to the
different triples of C and R = Rx ∪Ry ∪Rz where Rt = {rt1, . . . , rtn} for t = x, y, z,
corresponds to elements of X ∪ Y ∪ Z. Moreover for t = x, y, z, lirtj ∈ E if and
only if tj is an element of triplet si. This particular bipartite graph is usually called
representative bipartite graph. We use gadget H(li) for each li ∈ L to characterize
triplets of C. This gadget is illustrated in Figure 4 (on the left of the drawing).
The construction of G is complete and its maximum degree is 5. We claim that I
admits a perfect matching if and only if there exists a Nash stable partition pi of (G,F)
with soc(pi) ≥ 5m+n. Actually, we will prove that 5m+n is the best value reachable
by any Nash stable partition pi.
Clearly, if C′ ⊆ C is a set of n triples forming a perfect matching, then consider the
following partition pi. For si = (xi1 , yi2 , zi3) ∈ C′, set pi(di) = {di}, pi(ei) = {ei} and
pi(li) = {bi, ci, li, rxi1 , ryi2 , rzi3}; an illustration of these 3 coalitions is proposed in Figure
4 (on the right of the drawing). Otherwise, for si /∈ C′, set pi(li) = {li, bi, ci, di, ei}. It
is easy to see that pi is a Nash stable partition with soc(pi) = 6n+5(m−n) = 5m+n.
bici
di
ei
li
rx1
ry1
rz1
di
ei
li
rx1
ry1
rz1
Fig. 4. On the left: Gadget H(li). On the right: a possible Nash stable partition for agents in
H(li).
Conversely, let pi be a Nash stable partition. If {li, rtj} ⊆ pi(rtj) for some j ∈ [n]
and t = x, y, z, then:
Property 2. (i) ∀i′ 6= i, li′ /∈ pi(rtj), (ii) {bi, ci} ⊆ pi(rtj) and {di, ei} ∩ pi(rtj) = ∅.
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Let Cov = {li ∈ L : |pi(li)| = 6} and p = |Cov|. By Property 2, for every li ∈
Cov, it must be pi(ei) = {ei} and pi(di) = {di} (see right picture of Figure 4 for
an illustration); actually, these collations correspond to a (3-dimensional) matching of
size p. Using Property 2, we know that we also loose in the sociality function, as many
trivial stars as the number of vertices of R \ (∪li∈Covpi(li)). Hence, soc(pi) ≤ 5m +
3n − (2p + 3n − 3p) = 5m + p ≤ 5m + n and the last inequality is tight only when
|Cov| = n or equivalently when C′ = {si | li ∈ Cov} is a perfect matching. uunionsq
Corollary 1. Computing the best Nash stable partition with respect to either sociality
or fragmentation is NP-hard even for planar graphs.
As to the problem of computing a worst Nash stable partition, we give a hardness
result with respect to sociality, while the case of the fragmentation social function re-
mains open.
Theorem 13. Computing the worst Nash stable partition with respect to sociality is
NP-hard when the input graph G has maximum degree equal to 11.
5 Conclusion
Two problems are left open: closing the gap between upper and lower bounds on the
PoS with respect to sociality for games played on general graphs, and determining the
complexity of computing a worst Nash stable partition with respect to fragmentation.
Addressing the problem of computing extreme core stable partition is also worth to be
investigated.
Applying our feasibility constraint (i.e. imposing a spanning star) to hedonic games
having agents’ preferences other than the ones considered in this paper is clearly an
interesting research direction. Other graph patterns are appealing in our opinion: the
largest distance between any pair of agents, or the distance to some agent of the coalition
can be upper bounded by a given number (for the latter the distance to some agent is 1
in this paper).
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